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Newsletter - December 2025

Code Auditing
December 31, 2025

Top 3 DeFi Incidents in December

Yearn Finance: ~$9M

On December 1, Yearn Finance’s yETH pool on Ethereum was exploited, resulting in total losses exceeding $9 million. With assistance from external security teams, about $2.39 million (857.49 pxETH) was successfully rescued on the same day.

The vulnerability resided in the _calc_supply() function, which used an iterative method to calculate new supply approximations. Unsafe math operations caused rounding errors and underflow issues. While the vulnerability itself appeared relatively straightforward, the attacker executed sophisticated steps to exploit it, manipulating the pool's supply down to zero before extracting profits.

Sixteen days later, the protocol suffered a second breach as an outdated contract from its legacy version (iEarn) was compromised. This incident exploited a known misconfiguration vulnerability previously identified in 2023. The second incident resulted in $300k in losses, bringing the protocol's total monthly impact to nearly $10 million.

Read official post-mortem for detailed attack analysis

Trust Wallet: ~$7M

On Christmas Day, Trust Wallet suffered a critical security breach in its Chrome extension (v2.68), resulting in the theft of approximately $7 million in user funds.

The root cause was a malicious backdoor injected into the codebase, suspected to have originated from a social engineering attack targeting the development team. This backdoor method uploads user memonics to an attacker-controlled server, compromising any memonics generated or imported using this specific version of the extension. The attacker subsequently drained user funds on multiple chains and routed them to non-KYC exchanges.

Following the incident, the Trust Wallet team released an emergency update to remove the backdoor and committed to a compensation plan for affected users. This breach serves as a stark reminder that security must span the entire protocol lifecycle. Beyond on-chain code audits, securing off-chain infrastructure and maintaining continuous monitoring are essential to safeguarding user assets.

Ribbon Finance: ~$2.7M

On December 12, Ribbon Finance on Ethereum was attacked, resulting in a loss of $2.7 million.

The root cause was improper access control in the setAssetPricer() function within the Oracle contract, allowing anyone to arbitrarily set asset prices. The attacker exploited this by first setting a legitimate-looking price oracle to avoid detection, as the protocol only settles options on whole-week intervals. After creating and purchasing a call option position, the attacker waited until the exercise date to upgrade the contract and replace the benign oracle with a malicious one that set an artificially inflated asset price, then exercised the option to extract profit.

This incident highlights that access control remains a critical aspect of smart contract security. A single oversight in permission management can expose protocols to significant risks. Comprehensive security audits that examine all administrative functions are essential before deployment to identify and address such vulnerabilities.

The information above is based on data as of 00:00 UTC, December 30, 2025.

This concludes the December security incidents brief

You can learn more in our Security Incidents Library.

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Bitget's $387.5M Off-Chain Breach: Beyond Keys and Contracts
Security Insights

Bitget's $387.5M Off-Chain Breach: Beyond Keys and Contracts

On September 24, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in a third-party security product, obtained internal credentials, and forged withdrawal commands. The resulting transfers moved approximately $387.5M from some of Bitget's operational wallets across Ethereum, other EVM networks, XRP Ledger, Zcash, and TRON; private keys and cold wallets remained intact. This deep dive summarizes the disclosed incident path and fund flow, examines rapid conversion into native assets and the ecosystem recovery response, proposes a systematic defense-in-depth framework for institutions, and explains how authorized blockchain penetration testing can validate cross-layer assumptions.

~$11.3M Lost: Multicall Router, Nostra | BlockSec Weekly
Security Insights

~$11.3M Lost: Multicall Router, Nostra | BlockSec Weekly

This report, covering 2026/09/14 - 2026/09/20, examines two security incidents with approximately $11.3M in combined losses, on Ethereum and Starknet. In the larger one, a multicall router accepted its own address as a dispatch target, so the nested call reached the Gateway module of a Safe wallet carrying the router's own already-authorized identity instead of the external caller's, and roughly 2,900 `aEthrsETH` was routed out of that wallet into an attacker-created Uniswap v4 pool. On Starknet, Nostra's oracle integration required a minimum of only one aggregated source, so when only two of the three configured price sources reached the aggregation, a manipulated thin-pool quote averaged with a normal quote to value `NSTR` at roughly $49.52, supporting approximately $3.5M of borrowing against overvalued collateral.

~$320M Lost: Liquid Network, Symbiosis Exploits | BlockSec
Security Insights

~$320M Lost: Liquid Network, Symbiosis Exploits | BlockSec

This report, covering 2026/09/07 - 2026/09/13, examines two security incidents that caused approximately $320M in losses, including the Liquid Network exploit of 2026/09/06 that the previous report did not cover. The larger was that Liquid Network exploit, where the rangeproof validation cache in Elements derived its key by hashing four fields — two of them variable in length — concatenated with nothing marking the boundaries between them, so a verdict recorded for one output was returned for another whose proof was never examined, letting the attacker create 4,000 unbacked L-BTC and peg out nearly all of them as bitcoin. On the Bitcoin route of the Symbiosis cross-chain bridge, spanning BNB Smart Chain, Ethereum and Rootstock, off-chain code that reads Bitcoin deposits took the depositor's identity from a field the depositor controls and then subtracted its fee from the deposit without checking whether the fee itself was negative, letting a 330-satoshi deposit mint `46,116,860,184.27388234 syBTC`; the pools it had to be sold through held only 11.26 syBTC, so the loss to liquidity providers and users came to an estimated 9.97 BTC (~$770K).

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Newsletter - December 2025