Total Security and Compliance for RWA
Build Investor Trust and Secure Your Platform at every layer: Audit your tokenization contracts, screen every transaction, and protect your treasury.
Identify and fix vulnerabilities before attackers can exploit them.
Build a foundation of trust with your investors from day one.
Automatically screen investors and transactions against global sanctions lists.
Avoid regulatory penalties and operational freezes by blocking high-risk transfers.
Uphold your compliance obligations for token holders in every jurisdiction.
Get real-time monitoring and alerts for the treasuries holding your backing assets.
Prevent unauthorized movement of the real-world assets backing your tokens.
Automatically respond to block threats on-chain. Also, understand the methods behind any suspicious fund movements.
Gain actionable intelligence to strengthen security and inform stakeholders of timely incident resolution.
Build a Secure and Compliant RWA Pipeline
Top 10 "Awesome" Security Incidents in 2025
To help the community learn from what happened, BlockSec selected ten incidents that stood out most this year. These cases were chosen not only for the scale of loss, but also for the distinct techniques involved, the unexpected twists in execution, and the new or underexplored attack surfaces they revealed.
#10 Panoptic Incident: XOR Linearity Breaks the Position Fingerprint Scheme
On August 29, 2025, Panoptic disclosed a Cantina bounty finding and confirmed that, with support from Cantina and Seal911, it executed a rescue operation on August 25 to secure roughly $400K in funds. The issue stemmed from a flaw in Panoptic’s position fingerprint calculation algorithm, which could have enabled incorrect position identification and downstream fund risk.
#9 1inch Incident: From Calldata Corruption to Forged Settlement: Binary Exploitation Goes On-Chain
On March 5, 2025, a third-party resolver integrated with 1inch Fusion V1 was exploited for over $5M after an unsafe calldata reconstruction in the settlement flow allowed attacker-controlled interaction lengths to trigger a pointer underflow and inject forged settlement data. The impact was amplified by a broken trust boundary, where resolver contracts treated forwarded calldata as authoritative based only on msg.sender, letting attacker-crafted payloads inherit settlement-level privileges while still passing access control.
For 500+ clients, from Web3 leaders to global regulators
