Next-Generation Security for L1 & L2 Chains
Protect your infrastructure before launch. Block attacks at the source to shield your ecosystem and reputation.
Audit core infrastructure, including the VM, bridges, and consensus.
Monitor all on-chain and mempool activities for threats.
Get instant alerts on attacks targeted dApps in your ecosystem.
Track illicit funds to maintain your chain's compliance posture.
Block large-scale hacks before attackers execute them on-chain.
Protect all ecosystem protocols and users with native, real-time defense.
Receive detailed post-mortem reports that deconstruct the full attack vector.
Implement actionable insights to harden your chain against future incidents.
Protect Your Chain Infrastructure at the Core
“Phalcon is an effective tool that helps project teams complete core monitoring in a very short period. Additionally, Phalcon is backed by a highly professional technical team that can provide timely support, solution discussions, development, and testing.”
Top 10 "Awesome" Security Incidents in 2025
To help the community learn from what happened, BlockSec selected ten incidents that stood out most this year. These cases were chosen not only for the scale of loss, but also for the distinct techniques involved, the unexpected twists in execution, and the new or underexplored attack surfaces they revealed.
#10 Panoptic Incident: XOR Linearity Breaks the Position Fingerprint Scheme
On August 29, 2025, Panoptic disclosed a Cantina bounty finding and confirmed that, with support from Cantina and Seal911, it executed a rescue operation on August 25 to secure roughly $400K in funds. The issue stemmed from a flaw in Panoptic’s position fingerprint calculation algorithm, which could have enabled incorrect position identification and downstream fund risk.
#9 1inch Incident: From Calldata Corruption to Forged Settlement: Binary Exploitation Goes On-Chain
On March 5, 2025, a third-party resolver integrated with 1inch Fusion V1 was exploited for over $5M after an unsafe calldata reconstruction in the settlement flow allowed attacker-controlled interaction lengths to trigger a pointer underflow and inject forged settlement data. The impact was amplified by a broken trust boundary, where resolver contracts treated forwarded calldata as authoritative based only on msg.sender, letting attacker-crafted payloads inherit settlement-level privileges while still passing access control.
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