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Newsletter - January 2026

Code AuditingPhalcon Security
February 1, 2026
3 min read
Key Insights
  • ~$50M lost across three DeFi exploits in Jan 2026: Truebit (~$26M), SwapNet & Aperture (~$17M), Saga (~$7M)

  • Truebit: integer overflow in TRU pricing (Solidity 0.6.10 without overflow checks) let attacker buy cheaply and drain 8,535 ETH; mandate overflow-checked math.

Top 3 DeFi Incidents in January

Truebit Protocol: ~$26M

On January 8, 2026, Truebit Protocol on Ethereum was exploited, resulting in approximately $26 million in losses. This incident underscores the critical importance of robust smart contract security.

The root cause was an integer overflow vulnerability in the TRU token purchase pricing function. The contract was compiled with Solidity v0.6.10, which does not enforce overflow checks by default. The attacker crafted input parameters that caused a large intermediate value in the purchase cost calculation to overflow and wrap around to a much smaller number. This allowed the attacker to purchase large amounts of TRU tokens at minimal or even zero ETH cost.

The attacker performed multiple rounds of arbitrage within a single attack transaction, repeatedly executing buy and sell operations on TRU tokens. Notably, the protocol had intentionally designed pricing asymmetry between buying and selling to prevent immediate buy-sell arbitrage. However, the vulnerable contract was deployed using an outdated Solidity version without overflow protection, exposing the attack surface and ultimately leading to the draining of 8,535 ETH from protocol reserves.

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SwapNet & Aperture: ~$17M

On January 25, 2026, SwapNet and Aperture Finance suffered attacks stemming from a shared vulnerability, resulting in approximately $17 million in total losses. The attack significantly impacted Matcha Meta users, with affected funds exceeding $13 million.

Although both affected contracts were closed-source, the attack paths could be reconstructed by analyzing decompiled bytecode alongside on-chain transaction traces. The root cause was insufficient validation on crucial user inputs within vulnerable functions, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary calls with malicious parameters. In a series of attack transactions, attackers constructed ERC20 transferFrom() invocations to drain tokens from users who had previously granted token allowances to the vulnerable contracts. This highlights a common DeFi security risk.

Both protocols involved in this attack did not open-source their code, making it difficult for the community to identify security vulnerabilities through public review. Meanwhile, the allowance-based attack approach serves as a wake-up call for the industry: users must carefully manage their token allowances, while protocols should implement protective mechanisms such as time-locked or capped approvals to fundamentally mitigate the risks of such attacks.

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Saga: ~$7M

On January 21, 2026, SagaEVM in the Saga ecosystem was exploited, resulting in unauthorized token minting and a loss of approximately $7 million. This incident underscores the importance of robust blockchain security across all layers.

While the root cause has not yet been fully disclosed, official sources have confirmed that a shared vulnerability in Ethermint and CosmosEVM code, which was inherited by SagaEVM—led to the attack. The attacker deployed malicious smart contracts to execute the exploit, minting a substantial amount of Saga Dollars. Following the successful attack, nearly all stolen funds was swiftly transferred to the Ethereum network via cross-chain bridges.

This incident highlights the risks of code inheritance in blockchain ecosystems. When vulnerabilities exist in foundational codebases, all projects inheriting that code may face the same threats, creating cascading security vulnerabilities. Comprehensive infrastructure audits are crucial for such ecosystems.

The information above is based on data as of 00:00 UTC, January 31, 2026.

This concludes the January security incidents brief. For more in-depth analysis of blockchain security incidents and Web3 security trends, you can explore our resources.

You can learn more in our Security Incidents Library.

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~$9.4M Lost: Injective, Aquifer Exploits | BlockSec Weekly
Security Insights

~$9.4M Lost: Injective, Aquifer Exploits | BlockSec Weekly

During the past week (2026/08/31 - 2026/09/06), four security incidents caused approximately $9.4M in losses across Injective, Solana, Ethereum, and Flow EVM. The largest was the Injective exploit, where an insurance fund identifier collided with a binary options market identifier and the settlement path never compared their denominations, draining about $4.8M; Aquifer on Solana lost about $2.47M because its swap path invoked an unvalidated caller-supplied Token Program, and Notional Finance V1 on Ethereum lost about $1.73M to an unchecked `uint128` cast that valued a debt at zero. Ankr FLOW on Flow EVM closed out the week with about $410K drained through a staking entry point that skipped its pause guard and minted against a stale ratio.

From Incidents to Regulation: Why Crypto Institutions Need Blockchain Penetration Testing
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From Incidents to Regulation: Why Crypto Institutions Need Blockchain Penetration Testing

Exchanges, payment firms, custodians, and wallet providers now lose the most money beyond the smart contract—in signing, custody, keys, people, and supply chains. Code-level audit and transaction-level monitoring each leave a gap, and traditional penetration tests may miss crypto's signing and fund semantics. This article opens our blockchain penetration testing series with the two legs of the case for institutions in scope: where the risk actually comes from, and how NYDFS, DORA, VARA, SFC, and MAS treat adversarial testing across five jurisdictions.

What Is Blockchain Penetration Testing? Definitions and Boundaries
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What Is Blockchain Penetration Testing? Definitions and Boundaries

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