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Security Audit Report for DCS Protocol's Merchant Factory Contracts

DESCRIPTION

The target of this audit is the private code repository of Merchant Factory Contracts of DCS Protocol. Merchant Factory Contracts of DCS Protocol is a stablecoin acquiring infrastructure that enables recurring, operator-driven pull payments, deterministic per-merchant payout routing, and allowlisted fee distribution. The contract MerchantFactory serves as the single entrypoint for charge authorization, fee validation, and on-demand proxy deployment. The contract MerchantContract is a singleton implementation, and the factory deploys a minimal-proxy clone of it for each merchant and token, which pulls funds directly from the payer to the merchant destination and the fee receiver within the same transaction.

Please refer to the report for the detailed audit scope.

Our audit methodology employs automated vulnerability scans, manual verification, and business logic analysis to uncover potential security issues coupled with gas and code quality optimization recommendations.

In summary, we did not identify any potential issues within the audited codebase. However, we have some recommendations and notes that should be considered to further enhance the protocol's quality, security, and reliability. With no potential issues identified, the project demonstrates a relatively high level of security. It should also be noted that the scope of our audit was strictly limited to the specific code versions detailed in the report. Any updates subsequent to our review would necessitate a re-evaluation.

KEY FINDINGS

In total, we find 0 potential issues in the smart contract. We also have 6 recommendations and 2 notes, as follows:

High Risk: 0
Medium Risk: 0
Low Risk: 0
Recommendation: 6
Note: 2
ID Severity Description Status
1 - Remove redundant code Fixed
2 - Add non-zero checks for parameters of the contract MerchantFactory Partially
3 - Revise the visibility of the function _getCompoundSalt() Fixed
4 - Revise the events MerchantCreated and TransferExecutedWithFee Confirm
5 - Revise the file README to align with the implementation Fixed
6 - Revise the event emission logic for the event TransferExecutedWithFee Confirm
7 - Potential centralization risks -
8 - Ensure uuid is unique across invocations and all supported chains -

More details are provided in the audit report.

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Security Audit Report for DCS Protocol's Merchant Factory Contracts - BlockSec