我们很高兴地宣布，BlockSec 已完成由方舟资本领投的种子轮融资，A&T Capital、趣链、Impossible Finance、Incuba Alpha 以及 NEAR MetaWeb Ventures 参投。
BlockSec 成立于 2021 年，今年已服务超过 50 位客户，保护了价值数千数百万的数字资产。其拥有适用于 BSC 和 Ethereum 的在线交易虚拟化系统（https://tx.blocksecteam.com）以及适用于 Ethereum 和 Cronos 的闪电贷监控系统（https://versatile.blocksecteam.com/flashloan）。
BlockSec 团队专注于区块链生态系统的安全，并与领先的 DeFi 项目合作以确保其产品的安全。该团队由顶尖的安全研究人员以及来自学术界和工业界的经验丰富的专家组成。他们曾在顶级会议上发表过多篇区块链安全论文，报告了多个 DeFi 应用的零日漏洞攻击，并发布了具有重大影响的安全事件的详细分析报告。
Tracing $1.6B in TRON USDT: Inside the VerilyHK Ponzi Infrastructure
An on-chain investigation into VerilyHK, a fraudulent platform that moved $1.6B in TRON USDT through a multi-layered fund-routing infrastructure of rotating wallets, paired payout channels, and exchange exit funnels, with traced connections to the FinCEN-sanctioned Huione Group.
Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 30 – Apr 5, 2026
This BlockSec weekly security report covers nine DeFi attack incidents detected between March 30 and April 5, 2026, across Solana, BNB Chain, Arbitrum, and Polygon, with total estimated losses of approximately $287M. The week was dominated by the $285.3M Drift Protocol exploit on Solana, where attackers combined multisig signer social engineering with Solana's durable nonce mechanism to bypass a zero-timelock 2-of-5 Security Council, alongside notable incidents including a $950K flash loan TWAP manipulation against the LML staking protocol, a $359K Silo Finance vault inflation via an external `wstUSR` market donation exploiting a depegged-asset oracle and `totalAssets()` accounting flaw, and an EIP-7702 delegated-code access control failure. The report provides detailed vulnerability analysis and attack transaction breakdowns for each incident, covering flawed business logic, access control, price manipulation, phishing, and misconfiguration attack types.
Drift Protocol Incident: Multisig Governance Compromise via Durable Nonce Exploitation
On April 1, 2026 (UTC), Drift Protocol on Solana suffered a $285.3M loss after an attacker exploited Solana's durable nonce mechanism to delay the execution of phished multisig approvals, ultimately transferring administrative control of the protocol's 2-of-5 Squads governance with zero timelock. With full admin privileges, the attacker created a malicious collateral market (CVT), inflated its oracle price, relaxed withdrawal protections, and drained USDC, JLP, SOL, cbBTC, and other assets through 31 rapid withdrawals in approximately 12 minutes. This incident highlights how durable nonce-based delayed execution can decouple signer intent from on-chain execution, bypassing the temporal assumptions that multisig security implicitly relies on.