Back to Blog

The Initial Analysis of the PolyNetwork Hack

Code Auditing
August 11, 2021

The PolyNetwork has been hacked and more than 300 million USDs have been stolen. The attacker performed the attack on multiple chains. In this blog, we use the attack transaction on Ethereum (0xd8c1f7424593ddba11a0e072b61082bf3d931583cb75f7843fc2a8685d20033a ) to analyze the possible reason of the hack. Our initial analysis shows that one possible reason could be either the leakage of the private key that is used to sign the cross-chain message, or there is a bug in the signing process of the PolyNetwork that has been abused to sign a crafted message.

Disclaimer: This blog only contains the result of our initial analysis based on the onchain data on Ethereum. We cannot verify our findings without further information from Poly Network.

Update 2021/08/12: The further information shows that the cause of the attack is because the keeper has been modified by the attacker (not because of the leakage of the private key). We have a further analysis to answer the question why the transaction to change the keeper can be executed in the first place.

Transaction and call trace

We use our transaction analysis system to recover the trace.

Attacker -> EthCrossChainManager -> EthCrossChainData -> LockProxy -> managerProxyContractforLockProxy

  • 0xc8a65fadf0e0ddaf421f28feab69bf6e2e589963: Attacker
  • 0x838bf9e95cb12dd76a54c9f9d2e3082eaf928270: EthCrossChainManager
  • 0xcf2afe102057ba5c16f899271045a0a37fcb10f2: EthCrossChainData
  • 0x250e76987d838a75310c34bf422ea9f1ac4cc906: LockProxy
  • 0x5a51e2ebf8d136926b9ca7b59b60464e7c44d2eb: managerProxyContract for LockProxy

Function Signatures:

  • d450e04c (verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx)
  • 69d48074 (getCurEpochConPubKeyBytes)
  • 5ac40790 (getCurEpochStartHeight)
  • 0586763c (checkIfFromChainTxExist)
  • e90bfdcf (markFromChainTxExist(uint64,bytes32))

The main process of the attack

The main process of the attack is that the attacker passed the signed data to the function verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx(). This function will decode the data and verify the signatures that are used to sign the data. If this process passes, the method (and the contract address) specified in the message will be executed. During this attack, the unlock function of the smart contract 0x250e76987d838a75310c34bf422ea9f1ac4cc906 is invoked to transfer the Fei to the attacker.

In summary, the attack is due to the valid parameters passed to the verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx function. And the parameters can pass the signature verification process. After that, the transaction specified in the message will be executed (like the arbitrary command execution in software security.)

To better understand this process, we recover the critical values of the call trace.

Function: verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx:

verifySig

unlock

The variable of managerProxyContract in the LockProxy. It matches the value of the caller address of the unlock function.

Conclusion

From the recovered values, we find that:

  1. The attacker provides a valid signed message to the function verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx
  2. The onlyManagerContract modifier in the LockProxy smart contract is NOT bypassed.

Based on these two observations, we suspect that

  1. The attacker may have the legitimate keys to sign the messages, which indicate the signing keys may have been leaked.

Or

  1. There is a bug in the signing process of the PolyNetwork that has been abused to sign a crafted message.

However, we do not have further offchain data to verify our findings. We hope our analysis can be helpful for further investigation.

Credits: Yufeng Hu, Siwei Wu, Lei Wu, Yajin Zhou @BlockSec

Twitter: https://twitter.com/BlockSecTeam

Sign up for the latest updates
Beyond Secure Storage, Part 2: Implementing Wallet Cryptography Securely
Security Insights

Beyond Secure Storage, Part 2: Implementing Wallet Cryptography Securely

Can an attacker recover a private key without reading its protected copy? Part 2 of Beyond Secure Storage examines six incidents in which weak randomness, entropy loss, or signing nonce flaws made keys predictable or recoverable. It derives implementation requirements for key generation and signing, then explains how payment institutions can assess them through code review and testing of the deployed system.

Beyond Secure Storage, Part 1: Designing Secure Payment and Signing Workflows
Security Insights

Beyond Secure Storage, Part 1: Designing Secure Payment and Signing Workflows

How can an unauthorized operation obtain a valid signature without the attacker stealing the private key? Part 1 of Beyond Secure Storage uses incidents including Bitget, Bybit and Binance to examine authorization failures across payment requests, transaction construction, signing, execution and settlement. It derives design principles for preventing unauthorized operations and limiting losses, then explains how reviews, audits, penetration tests and exercises can verify those protections.

NEAR Intents Exploit: Refund Flaw and Security Lessons
Security Insights

NEAR Intents Exploit: Refund Flaw and Security Lessons

The NEAR Intents exploit used oversized refund events to preserve internal balances after the deposited assets were returned. This analysis reconstructs the receipt flow and seven BNB Chain withdrawals totaling 3,865,021 USDT, distinguishes those outflows from the project's reported full recovery, and outlines security considerations for developing and auditing NEAR smart contracts.

Best Security Auditor for Web3

Validate design, code, and business logic before launch. Aligned with the highest industry security standards.

BlockSec Audit