Back to Blog

Monthly Security Review: March 2024

April 1, 2024

Security at a Glance 👀

In March 2024, DeFi exploits resulted in losses of approximately $81 million. Fortunately, thanks to the efforts of all parties involved, most of the funds have been recovered, or negotiations are underway.

  • PrismaFi Exploit Incident

On March 28, PrismaFi on Ethereum was attacked, resulting in a loss of ~$11M. The root cause was Unverified User Input. Notably, the attack was carried out in 10+ transactions, with 2 copycat attackers. The project team managed to Pause the contract through multisig after more than 90 mins after the first attack. Using Phalcon to implement a single-signature emergency pause during this attack could have significantly reduced the losses.

The main attacker has expressed willingness to return the funds, and negotiations with the project team are still ongoing, check the negotiation chats.

  • Munchables Incident

On March 27, assets in Munchables on Blast L2 were drained of $62M. This incident was due to a malicious upgrade implemented by the developers (the contract was not open-sourced). Thankfully, the project team and the Blast L2 core team took action, and the developer returned the funds. Currently, all funds are held in a Safe{wallet} controlled by the Blast L2 Core Team.

Custody Statement; Timeline; Click here to learn more about the incident.

  • ParaSwap Exploit Incident

From March 19 to March 21, several users of ParaSwap were attacked, with total losses of at least $300K. The root cause was an Access Control Issue. It's worth mentioning that the main attacker returned 90% of the assets.

  • Unizen Exploit Incident

On March 08, Unizen on Ethereum and Polygon suffered an exploit resulting in a loss of $2.8 million. The root cause was an Unverified User Input issue. DeFi users should regularly check their approvals and stay vigilant!

Additionally, whitehats sent a rescue transaction on Polygon through bloXroute's Semi-Private RPC, but the rescue transaction was sent to the mempool and got front-run by MEV bots, causing controversy. Read more about this.

  • TGBS Token Exploit Incident

On March 06, TGBS Token on BSC suffered an exploit resulting in a loss of $150K. Interestingly, the changes made by the owner just an hour ago triggered the attack, so it might be another rug pull. Check the alert

  • WooFi Exploit Incident

On March 05, WooFi on Arbitrum suffered an exploit resulting in a loss of $8.75 million. The root cause was a Vulnerable Price Dependency issue. WooFi's lending market was exploited because the price of $Woo was manipulated to be extremely cheap, allowing the exploiter to borrow large amounts of $Woo via flashloan and easily repay it.

Although its price mechanism utilized Chainlink's oracle for price checks, Chainlink on Arbitrum did not provide $Woo's price, failing to prevent the attack. Read the post-mortem report

👉 You can view attack transactions, root cause, and PoC of the above incidents in our Security Incident List.

Blog Articles & Video

How L2 chains can implement several measures to enhance the security of top protocols and protect users' assets on the chain.

Secure your protocol's entire lifecycle with BlockSec. From pre-launch security audits to post-launch attack monitoring and blocking (Phalcon), we've got you covered.

BlockSec CEO Yajin Zhou takes the stage at Open Information House @ ETHDenver 2024 to deliver a pivotal speech titled "BlockSec & the Forefront of Security."

Don't miss this opportunity for an engaging and insightful discussion that promises to shift the way you think about blockchain security.

Partnership

The Blockscout blockchain explorer has integrated MetaSuites' address labels (Ethereum, Polygon, Gnosis, Optimism and Base) and GPT-powered transaction explanation (Ethereum) feature, and has also added quick access to Phalcon Explorer. 🎉🎉

New Site, New Chapter

Exciting news – we've given our website a complete makeover!

At BlockSec, we've got your back, ensuring your protocols are secure every step of the way, from the pre-launch to the post-launch stage! Click here to explore.

Sign up for the latest updates
Tracing $1.6B in TRON USDT: Inside the VerilyHK Ponzi Infrastructure
Case Studies

Tracing $1.6B in TRON USDT: Inside the VerilyHK Ponzi Infrastructure

An on-chain investigation into VerilyHK, a fraudulent platform that moved $1.6B in TRON USDT through a multi-layered fund-routing infrastructure of rotating wallets, paired payout channels, and exchange exit funnels, with traced connections to the FinCEN-sanctioned Huione Group.

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 30 – Apr 5, 2026
Security Insights

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 30 – Apr 5, 2026

This BlockSec weekly security report covers nine DeFi attack incidents detected between March 30 and April 5, 2026, across Solana, BNB Chain, Arbitrum, and Polygon, with total estimated losses of approximately $287M. The week was dominated by the $285.3M Drift Protocol exploit on Solana, where attackers combined multisig signer social engineering with Solana's durable nonce mechanism to bypass a zero-timelock 2-of-5 Security Council, alongside notable incidents including a $950K flash loan TWAP manipulation against the LML staking protocol, a $359K Silo Finance vault inflation via an external `wstUSR` market donation exploiting a depegged-asset oracle and `totalAssets()` accounting flaw, and an EIP-7702 delegated-code access control failure. The report provides detailed vulnerability analysis and attack transaction breakdowns for each incident, covering flawed business logic, access control, price manipulation, phishing, and misconfiguration attack types.

Drift Protocol Incident: Multisig Governance Compromise via Durable Nonce Exploitation
Security Insights

Drift Protocol Incident: Multisig Governance Compromise via Durable Nonce Exploitation

On April 1, 2026 (UTC), Drift Protocol on Solana suffered a $285.3M loss after an attacker exploited Solana's durable nonce mechanism to delay the execution of phished multisig approvals, ultimately transferring administrative control of the protocol's 2-of-5 Squads governance with zero timelock. With full admin privileges, the attacker created a malicious collateral market (CVT), inflated its oracle price, relaxed withdrawal protections, and drained USDC, JLP, SOL, cbBTC, and other assets through 31 rapid withdrawals in approximately 12 minutes. This incident highlights how durable nonce-based delayed execution can decouple signer intent from on-chain execution, bypassing the temporal assumptions that multisig security implicitly relies on.