Back to Blog

Our Short Analysis of the Profanity Tool Vulnerability

Code Auditing
September 21, 2022

The Wintermute has been exploited for more than 160M loss. The root cause is that the private key of the Wintermute project was compromised due to a vulnerability in the Profanity tool, which was used by Wintermute to generate the private key and the Ethereum account.

In this blog, we will describe the root cause of the vulnerability in Profanity and how the vulnerability can be exploited.

The Ethereum Address

The Ethereum address is generated from the Keccak-256 hash of the public key and is represented as hexadecimal numbers. The public key is generated from the private key using elliptic curve multiplication, which is irreversible. We can get a public key from a private key. However, we cannot get the private key given a public key, without brute force. Note that the length of the private key is 256 bits. Given a public key, you need at most 2^256 calculation to find the corresponding private key.

In a word, the relationship between the private/public key and the Ethereum address is shown in the following figure.

The Root Cause of the Vulnerability

The purpose of Profanity is to find a special Ethereum address, e.g., the five leading numbers of the address are zero. For this purpose, Profanity takes the following method.

The detailed implementation may be slightly different.

Note that, the length of private_key is 256 bits (2^256 different values). However, there is a vulnerability in generating the private key. Specifically, the seed (in step 1) is only 32 bits, and the process from the seed in step 1 to the private_key in step 2 is deterministic.

What’s the security impact here?

How to Exploit

Let’s say we have an Ethereum address with many valuable assets. If we can get its private key, then we can own this account and transfer all the assets out. However, as previously discussed, we must brute force the whole 2^256 space to find the private key, which is nearly impossible.

But what if the Ethereum address is generated from the Profanity tool? We can brute force to locate the private key with a much lower difficulty. We only need to specify the seed from 0 to 2^32-1 and repeat the same process until we locate the private key that can generate the same public key (and the Ethereum address). Since we only at most 2^32 * loop_threashold calculation. This is doable in a couple of hours or days/weeks if we have a powerful GPU cluster.

However, this is still an optimized algorithm. You can refer to the article from Slowmist for more details.

Takeaway

Making a DeFi project secure is not an easy job. Besides the code audit, we think the community should take a proactive method to monitor the project status, and block the attack before it even takes place.

About BlockSec

BlockSec is a pioneering blockchain security company established in 2021 by a group of globally distinguished security experts. The company is committed to enhancing security and usability for the emerging Web3 world in order to facilitate its mass adoption. To this end, BlockSec provides smart contract and EVM chain security auditing services, the Phalcon platform for security development and blocking threats proactively, the MetaSleuth platform for fund tracking and investigation, and MetaSuites extension for web3 builders surfing efficiently in the crypto world.

To date, the company has served over 300 esteemed clients such as MetaMask, Uniswap Foundation, Compound, Forta, and PancakeSwap, and received tens of millions of US dollars in two rounds of financing from preeminent investors, including Matrix Partners, Vitalbridge Capital, and Fenbushi Capital.

Official website: https://blocksec.com/

Official Twitter account: https://twitter.com/BlockSecTeam

Sign up for the latest updates
Tether Freezes $6.76M USDT Linked to Iran's IRGC & Houthi Forces: Why On-Chain Compliance is Now a Geopolitical Battlefield
Security Insights

Tether Freezes $6.76M USDT Linked to Iran's IRGC & Houthi Forces: Why On-Chain Compliance is Now a Geopolitical Battlefield

Looking ahead, targeted freezing events like this $6.76M USDT action will only become more common. On-chain data analysis is improving. Stablecoin issuers are also working closely with regulators. As a result, hidden illicit financial networks will be exposed.

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 2 – Mar 8, 2026
Security Insights

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 2 – Mar 8, 2026

During the week of March 2 to March 8, 2026, seven blockchain security incidents were reported with total losses of ~$3.25M. The incidents occurred across Base, BNB Chain, and Ethereum, exposing critical vulnerabilities in smart contract business logic, token deflationary mechanics, and asset price manipulation. The primary causes included a double-minting logic flaw during full token deposits that allowed an attacker to exponentially inflate their balances through repeated burn-and-mint cycles, a price manipulation vulnerability in an AMM-based lending market where artificially inflated vault shares created divergent price anchors to incorrectly force healthy positions into liquidation, and a flawed access control implementation relying on trivially spoofed contract interfaces that enabled attackers to bypass authorization to batch-mint and dump arbitrary tokens.

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Feb 23 – Mar 1, 2026
Security Insights

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Feb 23 – Mar 1, 2026

During the week of February 23 to March 1, 2026, seven blockchain security incidents were reported with total losses of ~$13M. The incidents affected multiple protocols, exposing critical weaknesses in oracle design/configuration, cryptographic verification, and core business logic. The primary drivers included oracle manipulation/misconfiguration that led to the largest loss at YieldBloxDAO (~$10M), a crypto-proof verification flaw that enabled the FOOMCASH (~$2.26M) exploit, and additional token design and logic errors impacting Ploutos, LAXO, STO, HedgePay, and an unknown contract, underscoring the need for rigorous audits and continuous monitoring across all protocol layers.