Back to Blog

Monthly Security Review: October 2024

November 1, 2024
2 min read

Security at a Glance 👀

Radiant: $58M

On October 16th, Radiant Capital suffered a security breach on Arbitrum and BSC, resulting in losses exceeding $50M. While the complete technical details of the exploit remain undisclosed, the protocol team confirmed the compromise of several developer wallets as the attack vector.

Read Radiant’s post-mortem report for more details

Unknown: $1.4M

On October 24th, an unknown Compound-fork protocol was exploited on Base, resulting in a loss of approximately $1.4m. While the affected contracts were unverified at the time of the incident, our analysis indicates that this attack was probably due to vulnerable price dependency on Uniswap spot price.

View the complete attack transaction list via Phalcon's Security Incidents

EGA: $554K

On October 5th, an unverified contract was exploited on BSC, causing a loss of $554k. The root cause was the lack of slippage protection in the function that buys EGA tokens from Pancake pairs, susceptible to price manipulation attacks.

Track the attack details using Phalcon Explorer

P719: $315K

On October 11th, P719 token was exploited on BSC, resulting in a loss of $315k. While the compromised contract was unverified, we suspect the root cause was a flawed token burn mechanism within the P719 trading functionality.

Get Started with Phalcon Security

Detect every threat, alert what matters, and block attacks.

Try now for free

BlockSec at Better Web3 Forum 2024 🔥

Watch the speech by BlockSec co-founder Yajin Zhou at the Better Web3 Forum 2024 to learn about the latest security trends, lessons from past incidents, why auditing alone is insufficient, and what project parties can do to ensure protocol security.

Sign up for the latest updates
Web3 Attack Surfaces: A Penetration Testing Overview
Security Services

Web3 Attack Surfaces: A Penetration Testing Overview

Crypto institutions keep every traditional attack surface and add the money-handling chain on top of it. This article gives testers a practical abstraction of the running system: a four-component model—Application, Authorization and Signing, Blockchain Interaction, and Infrastructure—with each component's responsibility, representative implementations, and inherited attack surfaces. It then structures web3-specific coverage into five attack-surface areas, from production and automation operations through signing intent, approval and withdrawal chains, and fund logic to on-chain transactions and deployed contracts.

~$23M Lost: Cosmos EVM, Moonwell Exploits | BlockSec Weekly
Security Insights

~$23M Lost: Cosmos EVM, Moonwell Exploits | BlockSec Weekly

During the reporting period (2026/08/22 - 2026/08/30), we cover 5 blockchain security incidents totaling approximately $22.7M in losses; an estimated $74M-$119.5M was drained from Tectonic, most of it erased when Cronos was rolled back to its pre-exploit state. The highlight is a six-chain Cosmos EVM exploit series (~$5.7M realized), traced on TAC Chain, where a shared balance-synchronization bug chained an underflow and an overflow to drain a staking pool. The report also analyzes Moonwell's combined collateral-accounting and oracle price manipulation, Tectonic's combined oracle-price and receipt-token exchange-rate manipulation of low-liquidity collateral, an Ajna liquidation business-logic flaw, and a Rain Card Contract Exploit Series with an Ed25519 signature-verification bypass (Avici, Tria, and others) on Solana.

Rules of Engagement and Production Safety for Institutional Blockchain Penetration Testing
Security Services

Rules of Engagement and Production Safety for Institutional Blockchain Penetration Testing

A penetration test that touches signing, withdrawal, and ledger systems is prepared before it runs. This article follows the engagement lifecycle: turning a business decision into objective, scope, named owners, and authorized access; recording authority, permitted techniques, operating limits, prohibited activity, communications, and evidence handling in a Rules of Engagement document; and protecting live service with measurable stop criteria, monitoring, change coordination, and named pause authority. It closes with the remediation and retest that turn findings into validated controls.