Back to Blog

LI.FI Attack: a Cross-chain Bridge Vulnerability? No, It’s Due to Unchecked External Call!

Code Auditing
March 21, 2022

According to the report from the LI.FI project and the Daniel Von Fange's twitter, we notice the LI.FI attack on March 20th, 2022. Since there is no detailed technical analysis of this vulnerability, we further analyze the attack in the following. We find the root cause of this attack is unchecked external call.

Attack Transaction

We started from the attack transaction to illustrate the attack process. The following screenshot shows the result of our transaction visualization system.

As shown in the above picutre, the whole attack process is fairly simple, which has no malicious smart contracts deployed and no flashloan involved. The only step the attacker performed is invoking the swapAndStartBridgeTokensViaCBridge(0x01c0a31a) function of the CBridgeFacet contract, which then transfers various of tokens (e.g. USDC, MATIC, RPL, GNO, USDT, MVI, AUDIO, AAVE, JRT, and DAI.) from different spenders to the EOA controllered by the attacker.

Code Analysis

We then dive in to the codes of the victim logic contract.

The codes of
The codes of
The codes of
The codes of

According to the above code, the swapAndStartBridgeTokensViaCBridge is an entrance of a cross-chain transaction in the source chain.

The LIFI project claims they can find the best route for users, named Smart Routing that is happening off-chain. In particular, front-end website computes the best route and encodes the parameters (including swap contract and routing path) into the parameters of the swapAndStartBridgeTokensViaCBridge function.

Clearly, the LIFI project does not consider that the function can be invoked by any accounts on blockchain, since the function performs no checks on the parameters, such as white-list and swap slippage. The most serious part is that the CBridgeFacet contract requires users to approve tokens, which causes the users' money at risk.

Profit

As a result, the attacker steals the money of LIFI users who approved their tokens to the CBridgeFacet contract by invoking the swapAnStartBridgeTokensViaCBridge function, which then invokes the transferFrom functions of different tokens. The loss statistics are shown in below table. The total losses are around $596K, which basically the same with the statistics from the LIFI project.

Token Amount Price
GNO 0.94 310.22
USDC 202,012.28 0.999655
MATIC 3,144.89 1.46
AUDIO 1,202.37 1.10
AAVE 8.99 149.99
RPL 44.86 31.2
MVI 22.95 131.82
USDT 368,745.29 1
DAI 8,421.49 0.999847
JRT 136,805.06 0.03789613

Lessons

This LIFI is a cross-chain bridge aggregator, and the victim contract is the entrance of the cross-chain transfer. The vulnerability is not due to complicated cross-chain logic, which has been shown in the previous security incidents in the corss-chain bridge. Instead, the root cause of this attack is the unchecked external call that is one of the top-10 common issues in solidity.

Since the DeFi projects becoming more complex, the project developers need to pay more attentions to write safe codes in addition to writing correct business codes. We strongly recommend that the project should NOT deploy unaudited contracts on blockchains.

About BlockSec

BlockSec is a pioneering blockchain security company established in 2021 by a group of globally distinguished security experts. The company is committed to enhancing security and usability for the emerging Web3 world in order to facilitate its mass adoption. To this end, BlockSec provides smart contract and EVM chain security auditing services, the Phalcon platform for security development and blocking threats proactively, the MetaSleuth platform for fund tracking and investigation, and MetaDock extension for web3 builders surfing efficiently in the crypto world.

To date, the company has served over 300 esteemed clients such as MetaMask, Uniswap Foundation, Compound, Forta, and PancakeSwap, and received tens of millions of US dollars in two rounds of financing from preeminent investors, including Matrix Partners, Vitalbridge Capital, and Fenbushi Capital.

Official website: https://blocksec.com/

Official Twitter account: https://twitter.com/BlockSecTeam

Sign up for the latest updates
~$542K Lost: MakerDaoBot Exploit | BlockSec Weekly
Security Insights

~$542K Lost: MakerDaoBot Exploit | BlockSec Weekly

This report covers 1 security incident on Ethereum from 2026/10/05 - 2026/10/11, with an estimated loss of approximately $542K. An attack contract deployed a malicious adapter and passed it to a MakerDaoBot function that lacked access control, causing the bot to grant the adapter permission over its internal MakerDAO balances. The adapter settled four legacy ETH-A auctions and converted 200 units of ETH-A collateral to WETH; the attack contract unwrapped it and sent 200 ETH to the attacker.

~$418M Lost: Bitget, NEAR Intents Exploits | BlockSec Weekly
Security Insights

~$418M Lost: Bitget, NEAR Intents Exploits | BlockSec Weekly

This biweekly security report records eight incidents from September 21 to October 4, 2026, with approximately $418.4M in losses across Ethereum, BNB Chain, Solana, Bitcoin, TRON, XRP Ledger, Zcash, Avalanche, NEAR, and related networks. Detailed analysis covers Bitget's $387.5M third-party security product vulnerability and NEAR Intents' $3.87M refund validation flaw and missing state rollback.

Bitget's $387.5M Off-Chain Breach: Beyond Keys and Contracts
Security Insights

Bitget's $387.5M Off-Chain Breach: Beyond Keys and Contracts

On September 24, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in a third-party security product, obtained internal credentials, and forged withdrawal commands. The resulting transfers moved approximately $387.5M from some of Bitget's operational wallets across Ethereum, other EVM networks, XRP Ledger, Zcash, and TRON; private keys and cold wallets remained intact. This deep dive summarizes the disclosed incident path and fund flow, examines rapid conversion into native assets and the ecosystem recovery response, proposes a systematic defense-in-depth framework for institutions, and explains how authorized blockchain penetration testing can validate cross-layer assumptions.

Best Security Auditor for Web3

Validate design, code, and business logic before launch. Aligned with the highest industry security standards.

BlockSec Audit
LI.FI Attack: a Cross-chain Bridge Vulnerability? No, It’s Due to Unchecked External Call!