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Security Audit Report for Rabby Wallet's swap-router-v1

DESCRIPTION

The target of this audit is the code repository of swap-router-v1 of Rabby Wallet. The protocol is a decentralized exchange (DEX) router that facilitates efficient token swaps by integrating multiple aggregators through a flexible adapter pattern, while ensuring robust fee management. Its core component, the DEX Aggregator, is a smart contract system that optimizes trades by splitting orders across various DEXs to secure better prices and minimize slippage for users.

Please refer to the report for the detailed audit scope.

Our audit methodology employs automated vulnerability scans, manual verification, and business logic analysis to uncover potential security issues coupled with gas and code quality optimization recommendations.

In summary, we did not find any critical issues within the audited codebase. However, we have identified some non-critical issues that should be addressed. Additionally, we have put forth recommendations to further strengthen the code logic, along with notes that should be taken into consideration. It is important to note that the scope of our audit was strictly limited to the specific code versions mentioned in the report. Any updates made subsequent to our review would require a re-evaluation.

KEY FINDINGS

In total, we find 5 potential issues in the smart contract. We also have 8 recommendations and 5 notes, as follows:

High Risk: 0
Medium Risk: 3
Low Risk: 2
Recommendation: 8
Note: 5
ID Severity Description Status
1 Medium Improper pause() mechanism causes the contract to be permanently paused Confirmed
2 Medium Fee mechanism can be circumvented Confirmed
3 Medium Pause and unpause conflict between different admins Fixed
4 Low Fee deduction after slippage check may reduce actual user received amount Fixed
5 Low Lack of refund mechanism in the contract Executor Fixed
6 - Inconsistent check Confirmed
7 - Non zero address checks Confirmed
8 - Ensure proper checks on parameter _admins Confirmed
9 - Check the existence of the adapter before adding it Fixed
10 - Spelling and comment errors Fixed
11 - Redundant code Fixed
12 - Add allowance revocation logic after swap operation Fixed
13 - Replace the function transfer() with the function call() Fixed
14 - Security consideration for delegatecallbased executor architecture -
15 - Security audit assumptions on trusted executors -
16 - Potential centralization risks -
17 - Weird ERC20 tokens -
18 - External pool/router without refund mechanism may cause unnecessary slippage -

More details are provided in the audit report.

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