Back to Blog

When “SafeMint” Becomes Unsafe: Lessons from the HypeBears Security Incident

Code Auditing
February 3, 2022

On the morning of Feb 3rd (+8 timezone), our system reported an attack transaction 0xfa97c3476aa8aeac662dae0cc3f0d3da48472ff4e7c55d0e305901ec37a2f704 towards the HypeBears NFT contract. After the investigation, we found it's a re-entrancy attack caused by the _safeMint function of ERC721.

The root cause

The project has a limitation of the NTFs that an account can mint. Basically, it has a map addressMinted that logs whether an account has minted the NTFs.

When minting NFTs, the code uses _safeMint function of the OZ reference implementation. This function is safe because it checks whether the receiver can receive ERC721 tokens. The can prevent the case that a NFT will be minted to a contract that cannot handle ERC721 tokens. According to the document:

If to refers to a smart contract, it must implement IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received, which is called upon a safe transfer. The following code shows the OZ implementation of _safeMint function.

However, this external function call creates a security loophole. Specifically, the attacker can perform a reentrant call inside the onERC721Received callback. For instance, in the vulnerable HypeBears contract, the attacker can invoke the mintNFT function again in the onERC721Received callback (since 1addressMinted` has not been updated.)

The attack

The following screenshot shows the attack transaction.

Lessons

The risk called by SafeMint has been discussed by security researchers link1 link2. However, we can still see the vulnerable code and the attack in the wild. As shown in the safeTransfer in QBridge security incident, using a safe function does not guarantee a safe contract 😃.

Sign up for the latest updates
Tracing $1.6B in TRON USDT: Inside the VerilyHK Ponzi Infrastructure
Case Studies

Tracing $1.6B in TRON USDT: Inside the VerilyHK Ponzi Infrastructure

An on-chain investigation into VerilyHK, a fraudulent platform that moved $1.6B in TRON USDT through a multi-layered fund-routing infrastructure of rotating wallets, paired payout channels, and exchange exit funnels, with traced connections to the FinCEN-sanctioned Huione Group.

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 30 – Apr 5, 2026
Security Insights

Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 30 – Apr 5, 2026

This BlockSec weekly security report covers nine DeFi attack incidents detected between March 30 and April 5, 2026, across Solana, BNB Chain, Arbitrum, and Polygon, with total estimated losses of approximately $287M. The week was dominated by the $285.3M Drift Protocol exploit on Solana, where attackers combined multisig signer social engineering with Solana's durable nonce mechanism to bypass a zero-timelock 2-of-5 Security Council, alongside notable incidents including a $950K flash loan TWAP manipulation against the LML staking protocol, a $359K Silo Finance vault inflation via an external `wstUSR` market donation exploiting a depegged-asset oracle and `totalAssets()` accounting flaw, and an EIP-7702 delegated-code access control failure. The report provides detailed vulnerability analysis and attack transaction breakdowns for each incident, covering flawed business logic, access control, price manipulation, phishing, and misconfiguration attack types.

Drift Protocol Incident: Multisig Governance Compromise via Durable Nonce Exploitation
Security Insights

Drift Protocol Incident: Multisig Governance Compromise via Durable Nonce Exploitation

On April 1, 2026 (UTC), Drift Protocol on Solana suffered a $285.3M loss after an attacker exploited Solana's durable nonce mechanism to delay the execution of phished multisig approvals, ultimately transferring administrative control of the protocol's 2-of-5 Squads governance with zero timelock. With full admin privileges, the attacker created a malicious collateral market (CVT), inflated its oracle price, relaxed withdrawal protections, and drained USDC, JLP, SOL, cbBTC, and other assets through 31 rapid withdrawals in approximately 12 minutes. This incident highlights how durable nonce-based delayed execution can decouple signer intent from on-chain execution, bypassing the temporal assumptions that multisig security implicitly relies on.

Best Security Auditor for Web3

Validate design, code, and business logic before launch. Aligned with the highest industry security standards.

BlockSec Audit