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Security Audit Report for Mantle's Reth

DESCRIPCIÓN

The target of this audit is the private code repository of Reth of Mantle. Mantle is an Ethereum Layer 2 (L2) network built on the OP Stack, with MNT as its gas token and BVM-ETH as its L2 representation of ETH. This audit covers Mantle’s customized fork of the Rust execution client reth, implemented in mantle-reth and op-reth. The client adds the Everest, Skadi, Limb, and Arsia hardforks and their activation rules, genesis construction for supported Mantle networks, and Layer 1 (L1) deposit processing with MNT and BVM-ETH minting and transfers. It also implements a frozen base fee mechanism and a data availability (DA) fee model with L1 data fees, operator fees, and a token ratio. Its preconfirmation transaction flow uses a dedicated transaction pool, a remote procedure call (RPC) entry point, and a journal for recovery after a restart. Additional RPC methods provide Mantle-specific fee estimation.

Please refer to the report for the detailed audit scope.

Our audit methodology employs automated vulnerability scans, manual verification, and business logic analysis to uncover potential security issues coupled with gas and code quality optimization recommendations.

In summary, we did not find any critical issues within the audited codebase. However, we have identified some non-critical issues that should be addressed. Additionally, we have put forth recommendations and notes that should be taken into consideration. It is important to note that the scope of our audit was strictly limited to the specific code versions mentioned in the report. Any updates made subsequent to our review would require a re-evaluation.

HALLAZGOS CLAVE

En total encontramos 6 posibles incidencias en el smart contract. Añadimos además 3 recomendaciones y 1 notas, como se detalla a continuación:

Riesgo alto: 0
Riesgo medio: 2
Riesgo bajo: 4
Recomendación: 3
Nota: 1
ID Severity Description Status
1 Medium Inconsistent decoding of _ethTxValue across L2 clients Fixed
2 Medium Incorrect state handling of revived FIFO entries during deduplication Fixed
3 Low Incorrect RPC extension hook composition prevents Mantle RPC initialization Confirmed
4 Low Incorrect L1 data fee estimation in the function mantle_arsia_check_funds() Fixed
5 Low Double deduction of SDM refunds understates preconfirmation gas accounting Confirmed
6 Low Missing access and authorization lists from the L1 fee estimation envelope Fixed
7 - Include the L1 and operator fee in the balance pre-check of the function handle_inner() Confirmed
8 - Perform transaction deduplication before preconfirmation admission checks Fixed
9 - Responder overwrite during concurrent preconfirmation retries for same transaction hash Fixed
10 - Potential centralization risk -

Encontrarás más detalles en el informe de auditoría.

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