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Security Audit Report for baelor's agent-router

DESCRIPCIÓN

The target of this audit is the private code repository of agent-router of baelor. The project introduces AgentRouter, a permissionless entry contract for the Cobo tokenized gold ecosystem. This contract mediates between XAUT and XAUE by routing user mint and redemption operations through an underlying contract, CoboFundToken. Specifically, it allows any user to deposit XAUT and receive XAUE shares, as well as to redeem XAUE shares back to XAUT via an asynchronous redemption flow. Additionally, the contract implements a blacklist mechanism to block sanctioned or non-compliant users from participating in either minting or redemption operations.

Please refer to the report for the detailed audit scope.

Our audit methodology employs automated vulnerability scans, manual verification, and business logic analysis to uncover potential security issues coupled with gas and code quality optimization recommendations.

In summary, we did not find any critical issues within the audited codebase. However, we have identified some non-critical issues that should be addressed. Additionally, we have put forth recommendations and notes that should be taken into consideration. It is important to note that the scope of our audit was strictly limited to the specific code versions mentioned in the report. Any updates made subsequent to our review would require a re-evaluation.

HALLAZGOS CLAVE

En total encontramos 2 posibles incidencias en el smart contract. Añadimos además 5 recomendaciones y 4 notas, como se detalla a continuación:

Riesgo alto: 0
Riesgo medio: 2
Riesgo bajo: 0
Recomendación: 5
Nota: 4
ID Severity Description Status
1 Medium Circumvention of blacklist check Confirm
2 Medium Lack of blacklist and pause validation Confirm
3 - Rename field navReqId in struct RouterRedemption Confirm
4 - Use explicit status for rejected claimable requests Confirm
5 - Correct length of storage gaps Fixed
6 - Add rescue token functionality Fixed
7 - Implement slippage protection on functions mint() and requestRedeem() Fixed
8 - Potential centralization risks -
9 - Proxy deployment and implementation binding should be atomic -
10 - Token implementation assumption -
11 - Assumptions on compliance responsibility -

Encontrarás más detalles en el informe de auditoría.

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