BESCHREIBUNG
The target of this audit is the private code repository of bgw7702 of bitgetwallet. BGW7702 is a smart account framework built for EIP-7702 delegation with optional ERC- 4337 compatibility. This upgrade introduces support for EIP-1271 and EIP-7851. Specifically, contract BGW7702Logic adds function isValidSignature() and EIP-7851 delegation renunciation checks, along with new entry functions aggregateWithValidator() and verifySignaturesWithValidator() (the latter in the contract BGW7702Admin). The upgrade also introduces a verification router, BGWVerifyRouterWithTimeLock, that maintains a mapping from verifyId to validator contracts, including Passkey/WebAuthn, SLH-DSA post-quantum signatures, and Guard-EOA. These external validators enable smart accounts to support additional signature schemes beyond traditional ECDSA.
Please refer to the report for the detailed audit scope.
Our audit methodology employs automated vulnerability scans, manual verification, and business logic analysis to uncover potential security issues coupled with gas and code quality optimization recommendations.
In summary, we did not find any critical issues within the audited codebase. However, we have identified some non-critical issues that should be addressed. Additionally, we have put forth recommendations and notes that should be taken into consideration. It is important to note that the scope of our audit was strictly limited to the specific code versions mentioned in the report. Any updates made subsequent to our review would require a re-evaluation.
WICHTIGSTE FESTSTELLUNGEN
Insgesamt haben wir 3 potenzielle Probleme im Smart Contract festgestellt. Darüber hinaus geben wir 1 Empfehlungen und 4 Hinweise. Diese sind nachfolgend aufgeführt:
| ID | Severity | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Low | Lack of proof of possession in function setAccountKey() |
Confirm |
| 2 | Low | Lack of verification on the renouncement status | Fixed |
| 3 | Low | Stale validator configuration after emergency deactivation | Confirm |
| 4 | - | Enforce hybrid signature scheme | Confirm |
| 5 | - | Potential centralization risks | - |
| 6 | - | SLH-DSA deployment requirement | - |
| 7 | - | EntryPoint trust assumption and EIP- 4337 compatibility | - |
| 8 | - | Integration assumption | - |
Weitere Einzelheiten finden Sie im Auditbericht.